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 Chapter 11 
 Analysis and Conclusions 
 Rinus  Penninx and  Blanca  Garcés-Mascareñas 
 Introduction 
 This state-of-the-art volume taking stock of and presenting existing research on 
integration processes and policies in Europe was triggered by European Union 
(EU)-level policymaking on integration. A 2011 European Commission policy doc-
ument proposes that integration policies should involve not only immigrants and the 
society of settlement but also actors in immigrants’ countries of origin (EC  2011 ). 
Compared to the Commission’s earlier defi nition of integration (EC  2003 ), this con-
stituted a shift from a two-way to a three-way process approach. The current volume 
has reformulated the EU’s policy shift into a broader question for academia and 
integration research: What does research have to say about (the study of) integration 
processes and, in particular, about the relevance of actors in origin countries for 
integration? What does the existing literature say about integration policies in 
Europe and use of the concept of integration in policy formulation and practice? 
Does the proposal to include actors in countries of origin as important players in 
integration policies fi nd legitimation in empirical research? 
 With the purpose of answering these questions, we asked experts in the relevant 
subfi elds to write state-of-the-art chapters. Chapter  2 , by Penninx and Garcés- 
Mascareñas, examined development of the concept of integration in the academic 
study of settlement processes of migrants and in policies. Chapter  3 , by Van Mol and 
De Valk, analysed changes in migration patterns and characteristics of immigrants 
as a potential explanatory factor for changes in integration processes and policies. 
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Chapters  4 ,  5 and  6 covered basic aspects of policy development: Doomernik and 
Bruquetas-Callejo wrote on national policies of EU countries, Scholten and Penninx 
analysed the multilevel governance of migration and integration, and Mügge and 
Van der Haar scrutinized the categorization and target groups of policies. The fol-
lowing Chaps.  7 ,  8 ,  9 and  10 shifted the focus to migrants’ countries of origin and 
the relevance of these for immigrants’ integration: Mügge took stock of the transna-
tional activities of individual migrants and the relation of these to integration; 
Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis reviewed the literature on transnational–local relations and 
the role of migrant organizations, as well as the relation of these with integration; 
and Østergaard-Nielsen outlined how governments of countries of origin relate to 
their citizens abroad and what this could potentially mean for their integration. 
Finally, King and Collyer examined the migration–development nexus in search of 
a possible relation between it and immigrant integration. 
 How do these elements of analysis come together to answer the questions posed 
above? This fi nal chapter fi rst considers how the concept of integration has been 
(and can be) used as an analytical tool in academic research on integration processes 
of immigrants. Second, it reviews the way integration as a concept has been used in 
policies at various levels. This leads into an analysis of how integration is perceived 
by actors at different levels in origin countries. These steps enable us to draw some 
fi nal conclusions on the European Commission’s proposal to move from a two-way 
to a three-way process approach. 
 The Concept of Integration 
 Integration is a rather specifi c post-war European term. As a fi eld of research, the 
study of settlement processes of immigrants in Europe has an ambivalent relation 
with an earlier tradition of settlement studies: that in the USA. Europe borrowed 
from North America the essential framing of such studies, as how immigrants as 
newcomers fi nd their place in the society in which they settle. Yet, the concept of 
assimilation that was developed by US researchers was rejected in Europe as lop-
sided in two respects: (i) in seeing the process of settlement as primarily one in 
which newcomers undergo a progression of cultural change and (ii) in seeing settle-
ment as a linear process towards assimilation in mainstream society. 
 The concept of integration as it developed in European research during the past 
half century remained focused on the settlement of newcomers, but became more 
complex and rich. First, research on integration looked systematically at both the 
society of settlement and at immigrants as the two parties involved in the settlement 
process, often recognizing a dominance of the receiving society in this process. 
Second, research spelled out several dimensions of the integration process: the 
legal/political, the socioeconomic, and the cultural/religious. 
 The legal/political dimension of integration was exhaustively studied in two 
main respects. First, studies explored the legal status attributed by admission poli-
cies and the consequences of that status (or the absence thereof) for integration. 
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Second, immigrants’ participation in politics (or the lack of such participation) was 
investigated in the broadest sense, with this second strand of research often labelled 
citizenship studies. 
 In the socio economic dimension, research looked at the position of immigrants 
in key fi elds of societal stratifi cation: work and income, education, housing, and 
health. Where the benchmarks were natives or non-immigrants, these studies were 
called equality studies. If they were longitudinal within a group, they were labelled 
(intergenerational) social mobility studies. 
 In the cultural/religious dimension, study of the cultural and religious adaptation 
of newcomers has long been central. Nowadays, however, the perception and accep-
tance of newcomers by natives has become increasingly important. Immigrants’ 
culture and religion are, furthermore, studied as collective phenomena, as is the 
political and societal organization of cultural and religious diversity and its recogni-
tion in the society of settlement. This branch of research has been incorporated 
under equity studies. 
 The study of integration has also gained by distinguishing between levels at 
which integration processes take place and by studying the different mechanisms 
involved. Firstly, there is the micro-level of individual immigrants and their house-
holds and kin, and the comparable micro-level of native individuals in the society of 
settlement, with research examining how they perceive and react to one another. 
Secondly, there is the level of collectivities of both immigrant groups and natives and 
how they relate to each other. Thirdly, there is the level of institutions, both general 
institutions relevant to all residents and specifi c ones of and for immigrants. 
 Chapter  2 traced the development of the concept of integration as a rich analyti-
cal tool with great potential, particularly when it is used in combination with sys-
tematic comparisons. This tool can also serve to map and look critically at integration 
research in Europe. In a review of the state of the art of European research on inte-
gration, Penninx et al. ( 2006 ) observe that most studies are strongly embedded in 
national contexts. Furthermore, they note that European research on migration and 
integration has been fragmented in three ways: a lack of comparative research, a 
lack of cooperation among disciplines, and a lack of integration of the different 
levels at which phenomena are studied. 
 In recent years, signifi cantly more international comparative research has been 
accomplished, often fi nanced by the EU, remedying to some extent the method-
ological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller  2002 ) that went hand-in-hand with 
a strong embeddedness of research in the national (policy) arena. Such comparisons 
may also help to overcome space-based forms of fragmentation by including more 
than one spatial unit (e.g., a borough, city, region, nation state, or supra-national or 
international arena). While the nation state was dominant in research from the 
beginning, there is now a growing body of research on both the local and the inter-
national and supra-national levels. The relations between these levels and the com-
plex ways in which they infl uence each other, however, have yet to be explored. 
 At the same time, fragmentation continues. Divisions are still strong along 
 disciplinary lines, with particularly legal and economic studies remaining 
largely  autonomous and employing self-contained approaches. Furthermore, new 
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 fragmentation has arisen, for example, in specializations within the three dimen-
sions of integration sketched above, such as citizenship studies, equality and social 
mobility studies, racism and xenophobia studies, and equity studies. Such special-
izations do have merit, as they deepen insights on the specifi c dimension concerned; 
but they may also bypass the larger integration picture. Holistic studies that take all 
three dimensions into account and look at interrelations between them are rare, 
though much needed for further theoretical development. 
 The Concept of Integration in Policies 
 The development of the concept of integration in policies (i.e., the specifi c meaning 
that is given explicitly or implicitly to integration in policy formulation and prac-
tice) must be understood against the backdrop of immigration’s framing in Europe. 
Here again, the transcontinental comparison between Europe and North America 
accentuates the differences. While the USA and Canada defi ne themselves as coun-
tries built by immigration and immigrants, North-Western European countries in the 
post-war period did exactly the opposite. Their guest worker policies set out to 
attract hands for their booming economies but on a temporary basis, ideally without 
guest workers’ families and with an explicit expectation of return. From this per-
spective, there was no need for integration policies in the legal/political and cul-
tural/religious sense, and integration in the socioeconomic dimension was pursued 
only as far and as long as required by immigrants’ presumably temporary stay. 
 National Integration Policies 
 Since the 1970s, and particularly after labour migration stopped in the mid-1970s, a 
contradiction has grown between the facts of immigration and countries’ self- 
perceived norm of not being a nation of immigration. In a few countries this tension 
led to comprehensive integration policies pertaining not only to the socioeconomic 
domain but also the political and cultural spheres. Sweden started such integration 
policies in 1975 (Hammar  2004 ) and the Netherlands followed suit in the early 
1980s (Penninx  1981 ). However, most national governments in Europe maintained 
the illusion of immigrants’ temporariness and return up to the late 1990s and 2000s, 
therefore confi ning themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures. In practice, this left the 
responsibility for integration to the local level of cities and to parties in civil society 
such as trade unions, churches, and welfare organizations (Penninx  2005 ). 
 When the increasingly politicized climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s pushed 
for the implementation of integration policies at the national level, the term integra-
tion started to acquire a different meaning. Whereas early policy conceptions such as 
those used in Sweden and the Netherlands had been rights-based, aimed at structural 
integration in the socioeconomic domains and framed in a liberal cultural atmosphere 
(later called “multicultural”), the new approach focused increasingly on the cultural 
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dimension of integration as an obligation of immigrants, as cultural and value-based 
commonalities were thought to be essential for social cohesion. Acquisition of 
national citizenship—promoted in early Swedish and Dutch policies as an instrument 
that would facilitate structural integration—was increasingly redefi ned as the crown 
on a fi nalized process of cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integra-
tion policies went hand in hand with a redefi nition of the identity of North-Western 
European countries. The claims and outcomes of discussions on the “identity” of 
receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, laïcist, equal, enlightened, etc.) 
were translated into civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integra-
tion courses of an assimilative nature. The latest development—compulsory pre-
immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands—extends this logic 
even further. Under the label of integration, such courses actually function as instru-
ments to make immigration more restrictive and selective (Guild et al.  2009 ). 
 The picture thus sketched is one that holds for the “fi rst generation immigration 
countries” in North-Western Europe. As Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo assert 
in Chap.  4 of this volume, this North-Western European model became dominant 
and infl uential, as the immigration regulations of these countries became the formal 
standard for the EU and, through the  acquis , the blueprint for all EU countries that 
acceded later. Similarly, these same countries tried in the 2000s to transpose their 
new national integration policies and civic integration courses to the European level 
as exemplary for other EU countries (Goeman  2012 ). Notwithstanding these pres-
sures, quite different immigration and integration policies developed in practice in 
the “second generation immigration countries”, particularly in Southern Europe. 
Most immigration to those countries has been legalized ex-post by regularizations. 
Integration measures and policies have been initiated since the mid-1990s, predomi-
nantly at the local and regional levels, based on rights of access to important social 
services irrespective of one’s immigrant status. Such local policies have aimed pri-
marily at insertion of migrants into the labour market and were embedded in a lib-
eral cultural atmosphere that has tended to use interculturality as a strategy. 
 Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo note a third model of integration policies 
emerging in the Central and East European member states. There the number of 
immigrants is still low and immigration and integration issues are not high political 
priorities. Mostly supported by European funding, civil society actors, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and local authorities have developed reception and 
integration activities while pressuring national governments to develop integration 
policies. 
 Local Integration Policies 
 Local integration policies have been either in the shadow of national integration 
policies or developed independently in the absence of national policy. This is largely 
due to the fact that migration policies (decisions on who is allowed to enter and 
stay) are predominantly a national competence. If immigration policy is followed 
by a national integration policy, as happened early on in Sweden and the Netherlands, 
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then local integration policies are stimulated and facilitated by these preceding 
national frameworks. This is why Dutch and Swedish cities have a relatively long 
history of local integration policies (Scholten et al.  2015 ; Penninx  2015 ). But, as we 
have seen, factual immigration is not necessarily followed by an integration policy 
at the national level. Most North-Western European countries did have sizeable 
immigration but did not develop national integration policies until the turn of the 
century. In the absence of national policies, many cities developed integration poli-
cies, to give just a few examples, Birmingham and Bradford in the UK, Berlin and 
Frankfurt in Germany, Vienna in Austria, and the cities of Zurich, Bern, and Basel 
in Switzerland (Penninx  2009 ). 
 Local integration policies became much more visible during the past decade. 
Cities organized themselves internationally in networks. These networks have been 
strongly supported and funded by the European Commission, and their activities 
have been studied extensively, often at the networks’ or the cities’ own request. 
Systematic comparison of local policies reveals signifi cant variation in the framing 
of policies and in the meaning of integration underlying local policies. Some initia-
tives, such as the Intercultural Cities Network, focus strongly on the cultural dimen-
sion of integration, using diversity as a strength and diversity management as a 
strategy. Other cities have framed integration policies primarily as a socioeconomic 
issue, using antidiscrimination and equality as strategies and mainstreaming as their 
governance principle. Still other cities have stressed the participation dimension of 
integration, looking at accessibility and opportunity structures, on one hand, and 
active “citizenship” of immigrants, on the other. Some cities have even developed a 
local concept of citizenship, as opposed to national citizenship. 
 Whatever the history of local integration policies or their basic orientation, ten-
sions have increasingly developed between the local and national levels. Some of 
these tensions may be attributable to the different views on how to implement immi-
gration policies—restrictive or otherwise. For instance, how are government admin-
istrators to handle migrants’ illegality in practice? What are the consequences of 
implementing restrictions on access to facilities and services in the domains of 
employment, housing, education, and healthcare to combat illegal residence? 
Friction may also arise on the new civic integration courses and the increased cul-
tural knowledge required for continued residence and naturalization. While national 
policies may be quite ideological, local practitioners typically seek more feasible 
solutions. Tensions also arise when the fi nancing of integration facilities is at stake, 
particularly when national policies prescribe new actions but fail to deliver the 
fi nancial and other resources needed to implement them. 
 EU Integration Policies 
 EU-level policies on migration are double-edged. EU citizens are granted full free-
dom of mobility within the EU, while common and restrictive immigration and 
asylum policies apply to third-country nationals (TCNs). This duality, established 
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from the very beginning with the 1999–2004 Tampere Programme, had three impor-
tant consequences for integration. First, integration policies at the EU level were 
aimed exclusively at TCNs while immigrants from within the EU were viewed as 
already integrated. Second, integration of TCNs was defi ned in a rather limited way 
in the early phase. As noted in the introduction to this book, EU policies started 
from the assumption that if the legal position of immigrants was equal to that of 
national citizens and if adequate instruments were in place to combat discrimina-
tion, then integration processes could be left to societal forces. The third conse-
quence was that, unlike immigration policies, EU integration policies were defi ned 
as non-binding, consensus policies, since national governments wanted to retain 
sovereignty in key domains associated with immigrant integration. 
 In 2003, the European Commission formulated its fi rst comprehensive and 
explicit view on integration policies based on a conceptualization of integration as 
a two-way process involving both immigrants and the receiving society. The Hague 
Programme (2004–2009) and the Stockholm Programme (2009–2014) marked a 
gradual expansion of the defi nition of immigrants’ integration, increasing the actors 
and stakeholders involved and the issues covered. This defi nitional expansion 
occurred along two main lines: an internal line and an external one. 
 The internal line encompasses two main national elements. First, more levels of 
integration governance were activated within destination countries. In this context, 
the networks of European cities that exchanged knowledge and best practices on 
integration policies (see Scholten et al.  2015 ), all funded by the European 
Commission, raised the visibility of local governmental actors. In countries such as 
Spain, regional-level governments also profi led themselves as important policy-
makers in the fi eld of immigrant integration. The conceptualization of and interests 
around immigrants’ integration have differed, however, even across different gov-
ernment levels within the same country. Second, more and more stakeholders at all 
levels became involved in and mobilized for policies, including migrant organiza-
tions, human rights organizations, NGOs, and social partners. 
 The external line of expansion of the defi nition of immigrants’ integration 
occurred when actors and stakeholders in countries of origin came into the picture. 
This happened in two ways, stemming from quite different sources and interests. 
First, after the turn of the century new international initiatives—stemming from the 
renewed Migration and Development (M&D) perspective—sought to establish a 
regulatory framework for international migration that would render migration ben-
efi cial for countries of origin and destination as well as for migrants themselves (see 
King and Collyer in this volume). The Global Commission on International 
Migration, the High-Level UN Dialogues on Migration, and the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development created frameworks in which both countries of origin 
and countries of destination were represented and their interests balanced and coor-
dinated. Both the EU and all major immigration countries in Europe were involved 
in these international developments. 
 A second way in which countries of origin became involved derived from the 
increased diffi culty experienced by European countries in controlling and regulat-
ing immigration without the help of countries of origin (and of countries of transit 
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to Europe). Several European countries, such as Spain, established bilateral agree-
ments with countries of origin in which cooperation on admission and, particularly, 
on return of irregular migrants was exchanged for development assistance or 
improved facilitation of regular migration—often temporary—to Europe (Garcés- 
Mascareñas  2012 , 171–173). The terminology of co-development emerged in this 
context, combining the renewed M&D perspective with the immigration and inte-
gration policy interests of European countries. The EU became increasingly 
involved in such cooperation programmes, many of which included local govern-
ments and NGOs in countries of origin (see Chaps.  8 and  10 in this volume). 
 The renewed European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals of 
2011 proposed to anchor these two external lines of policy development in the inte-
gration agenda, thereby adding the countries of origin as a third key actor in the 
process of immigrants’ integration. As stated in the Commission document, 
‘Countries of origin can have a role to play (...) in three ways: (1) to prepare the 
integration already before the migrants’ departure; (2) to support the migrants while 
in the EU, e.g. through support via the Embassies; (3) to prepare the migrant’s tem-
porary or defi nitive return with acquired experience and knowledge’ (EC  2011 , 10). 
The fi rst element responds to the pre-migration courses and requirements that some 
European immigration countries have recently developed in order to anticipate inte-
gration of those still to be admitted. The second legitimizes and encourages support 
for migrants from countries of origin during their stay elsewhere, a practice that 
governments in countries of origin have developed more systematically in order to 
bond with their compatriots abroad (see Østergaard-Nielsen in this volume). The 
third seems to include in its euphemistical formulation only voluntary return of 
legal migrants, as such referring primarily to the re-migration and development 
theme. Yet, if we look at concrete policies and policy implementation, one might 
readily assume that involuntary return of irregular migrants constitutes an important 
part of this policy stream. 
 This brief analytic description leads us to a few general conclusions on the mean-
ing of integration in policies in Europe. The fi rst is that integration policies—or 
policies under the fl ag of integration—have developed at many levels of govern-
ment: at the national level; at the local level of cities and municipalities; in some 
cases, at the level of (autonomous) regions or  Länder ; and at the supra-national level 
of the EU. This last is a relative newcomer, but nonetheless an increasingly impor-
tant platform for all. This “multilevelness” is a characteristic that will be present in 
the future. 
 The second conclusion is that—partly parallel to governmental multilevelness—
a multitude of stakeholders has become involved in integration as policy designers 
and implementers. This includes not only governmental and quasi-governmental 
actors but also and increasingly nongovernmental agents from immigrant collec-
tives, civil society in general, social partners, and NGOs. 
 Both the vertical multilevelness of policies and the horizontal involvement of an 
increasing number and diversity of stakeholders bring more varied interests to the 
policy table. Such different interests may not always be aligned, and may even 
clash. They may also lead to quite different views on what integration is, what 
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 integration policies should promote, and who needs what assistance in the integra-
tion process. If multilevel governance is normatively defi ned as the process through 
which policymaking and policy implementation is coordinated vertically between 
levels of government and attuned horizontally across governmental and nongovern-
mental actors (see Scholten et al.  2015 ), we can then conclude that we have only just 
started out, and that much more multilevel governance is needed in practice in the 
fi eld of integration. 
 Finally, our examination of the development of integration policies and defi ni-
tions of integration at the EU level enable us to place in context the shift from the 
original defi nition of integration as a two-way process to the EU’s new defi nition of 
integration as a three-way process. That shift fi nds its legitimation primarily in 
efforts to bring together the policy activities of different parties (i.e., in countries of 
origin and destination) in the different but related fi elds of integration, immigration 
control, and M&D. Policies in these three fi elds had previously developed simulta-
neously but separately. It is the logic of policymaking—and not an evidence-based 
scientifi c argument—that has guided this redefi nition. 
 Integration from the Perspective of Origin Countries 
 The fact that it was primarily a policymaking logic that guided the redefi nition of 
integration from a two-way to a three-way process does not necessarily mean that 
there is no scientifi c basis in support of such a shift. Chapters  7 ,  8 ,  9 and  10 sought 
empirical answers to a number of questions relevant in this regard: How is integra-
tion viewed by actors in the countries of origin? To what extent and how do coun-
tries of origin contribute to immigrants’ integration? Can integration in the country 
of destination be expected to contribute to development in the country of origin? 
 Migrants’ Transnational Activities 
 A fi rst way of answering such questions is to look systematically from the perspec-
tive of migrants themselves. Transnational studies decouple the concept of integra-
tion from its unique immigrant and society of settlement frame, looking at it instead 
as a process that takes place simultaneously in the country of settlement, (still) in 
the country of origin, and possibly even within a transnational community that is 
located in neither of the two. 
 Actors and policymakers within migrant receiving countries may not always 
accept such a frame shift (and in the politicized contexts of Europe it may increas-
ingly be rejected). The double or triple orientation is also seen as problematic in 
national(istic) thinking, which deems it “disloyal” to the nation and an “abuse” of 
the welfare state. Moreover, energy spent in transnational activities may be per-
ceived and defi ned—based on a zero-sum assumption—as being at the expense of 
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integration efforts in the country of settlement. Nonetheless, from the perspective of 
migrants, simultaneous integration and participation in these different worlds is not 
problematic. Indeed, it is unavoidable, as Mügge’s inventory of transnational activi-
ties in Chap.  7 indicates. The assumption that a transnational orientation and activi-
ties may come at the expense of integration (efforts) in the country of settlement has 
no basis in empirical research. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that trans-
national orientations and activities may co-exist with integration in the country of 
settlement without negative effects on one another. Though conclusions are based 
on a still limited number of case studies, for certain migrants transnational activities 
and integration may even reinforce each other. 
 Mügge (in this volume) points out that the same capital that equips immigrants 
for transnationalism may facilitate their structural integration in the receiving soci-
ety too. She observes that (i) economic integration of migrants in the settlement 
country is an important condition for remittances; (ii) the more fi nancial, social, and 
political capital immigrants have (acquired), the more capable they may be of devel-
oping transnational activities; and (iii) political transnational activities are very 
much shaped by the political opportunity structure of the country of settlement. 
Alternatively, feelings of exclusion in the homeland may foster integration in the 
host country while factual exclusion of migrants from politics in the homeland may 
trigger more radical forms of transnationalism to change the situation in the home-
land. Either way, homeland developments seem to be decisive for the form and 
direction of both integration and transnationalism. 
 Migrant Organizations, NGOs, and Local Governments 
 Transnational studies also demonstrate that more and more relations are developing 
between countries of settlement and countries of origin at the local level, through 
local authorities on both sides and through immigrant organizations. These studies 
have found that immigrants identify more easily with the local level and that local 
governments present themselves as more open to migrants’ transnational affi lia-
tions. Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis, in Chap.  8 , describe the efforts of local authorities 
to promote engagement of migrants in international cooperation projects as a means 
of positively impacting their integration in destination societies. This perspective 
renders the concept of integration rather participatory with an important entrepre-
neurial component, which supposedly has a social function and promotes social 
cohesion at the local level. 
 Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis also point to the mushrooming numbers of co- 
development programmes, aimed at linking immigrants and immigrant organiza-
tions with hometowns in origin countries for the purpose of development projects. 
These again seem clearly related to and embedded in integration policies at the 
local level. While the literature seems to confi rm a positive correlation between 
engagement in international exchange programmes and becoming more active in 
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the receiving society, the authors also conclude that the extent and nature of 
local-to- local projects and relationships are very much dependent on policies and 
available funding opportunities in destination countries. 
 Governments of Origin Countries 
 Sending countries have increasingly developed policies to bond with their citizens 
abroad. Østergaard-Nielsen (Chap.  9 ) suggests that such policies involve the eco-
nomic/socio-economic, the political, and the cultural/religious dimensions, often in 
combination. Motivations of origin-country governments for such activities may 
vary but the integration of their citizens in the country of settlement can ultimately 
only be a topic if the interests of the country of origin are served through its migrants. 
The specifi c content of what integration then should mean was well expressed by 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, who during a visit in Germany called for a ‘better 
integration of Turks in Germany’, meaning essentially better economic opportuni-
ties ‘but not assimilation’. These workers should, he said, continue to be ‘ambas-
sadors for Turkey’, to speak Turkish, to vote for him as the new President of Turkey, 
to be good Muslims, and to contribute to the economic development of Turkey. 
 While the strengthening of upward social mobility of emigrants in their countries 
of residence is usually interpreted as a win-win scenario for both sending countries 
and immigrants, it is still diffi cult to assess the exact impact of sending country poli-
cies on both migrant transnationality and migrant processes of settlement. First, it is 
diffi cult to determine to what extent emigrant state efforts to bond with their non- 
resident citizens are directly responsible for migrant transnational practices related 
to their country of origin. Second, it is diffi cult to determine the real impact of these 
policies on immigrants’ integration in the societies of settlement. In both respects, 
Østergaard-Nielsen (Chap.  9 in this volume) notes that emigrants and diasporas 
may not immediately respond to sending countries’ outreach. Moreover, she 
observes, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent European governments 
actually do move away from the zero-sum discourse and securitization optic on 
migrant transnationality towards the more integrated three-way approach envi-
sioned by the European Commission. 
 The M&D Nexus 
 The overall approach to migration and development seems to have fl uctuated, 
according to King and Collyer in Chap.  10 . Different understandings abound of the 
nature, forms, and processes of development, migration, and integration, in both 
applied and in theoretical terms. History has been marked by a series of “pendulum 
movements” from optimistic to pessimistic scenarios, depending more on the politi-
cal assumptions of the time than the concrete empirical evidence at hand. Since the 
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late 1990, a new favourable context has been born, pushing an optimistic upswing of 
the pendulum. The accompanying view is that migration could and should be turned 
in a triple-win scenario for all: the countries of origin, the countries of destination, 
and the migrants themselves. A number of elements has contributed to this perspec-
tive: the global acceleration of migration and shift to more fl uid forms of mobility 
(see Van Mol & De Valk in this volume), the rise of immigrants’ organizations in 
both places of origin and destination (see Mügge, and Van Ewijk and Nijenhuis in 
this volume), and the birth of an institutional framework at the global level within 
which countries of origin have been drawn and developed clout (e.g., the Global 
Commission on International Migration, the United Nations High-Level Dialogue 
on Migration and Integration, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development). 
 But how and where does integration come into this M&D approach? In principle, 
integration could come into the picture if we adopted the concept of transnational 
mobility (instead of migration) and shifted the focus to migrants’ integration in the 
place of origin, the place of destination, and possibly also the transnational com-
munity (instead of the classic framing of integration as a process involving migrants 
and the receiving society). From this perspective, the settlement of immigrants 
could be studied empirically in all of its dimensions (economic, social, cultural, and 
political) to assess as an open question whether it results in immigrants’ integration 
or the opposite. However, such a new approach to integration does not exist (yet). 
 From the M&D perspective, two concrete questions on integration then remain. 
The fi rst is how does integration impact on migrants’ capacity to stimulate develop-
ment in the countries of origin. Though much more research is still needed, some 
studies show that (successful) integration in the destination country is not necessarily 
a zero-sum game but rather a condition for successful integration in the country of 
origin. Chapters  7 and  8 both reach this conclusion in very similar wordings. The 
second question is what meaning does integration in the destination country have for 
immigrants’ reintegration in the country of origin. Research presented in this volume 
suggests that there are many patterns of return and reintegration, resulting from the 
fact—among others—that integration is just one of the multiple factors that deter-
mine reintegration chances and challenges. The literature seems to suggest that a 
return of failure (which can be interpreted as failed integration in the destination 
country) might be a predictor of a failed reintegration, particularly when development 
criteria are part of the reintegration concept. The so-called “return of innovation” 
seems to correlate with previous successful integration in the country of destination. 
 From a Two-Way to a Three-Way Process Conception 
of Integration 
 The European Commission has proposed a new way of looking at the integration 
process of immigrants in European societies—though by “immigrants” the 
Commission means third-country nationals (TCNs) only. The Commission’s shift in 
thinking can best be understood within the logic of EU-level policy development on 
R. Penninx and B. Garcés-Mascareñas
201
migration and integration and the M&D framework. Furthermore, creation of new 
institutional structures—bilateral ones between emigration and immigration coun-
tries, as well as those at the EU level and globally—has led to new policy initiatives 
by which different topics, actors, and interests have been brought to the table in 
relation to each other. Although the outcome of these developments is still uncer-
tain, one could interpret them as a step forward towards better multilevel gover-
nance. It is questionable, however, to what extent these new policy developments 
should go under the fl ag of integration policies targeting immigrants in European 
countries. 
 We established that the political process has been the driving force behind the 
incorporation of the countries of origin as a third actor in the concept of immigrants’ 
integration. There is no indication in the European Commission documents that 
research or any form of academic advice played a role in the proposal and in the 
argumentation used. When asked, researchers working in various subfi elds of immi-
gration, integration, transnationalism, and the M&D nexus could not determine on 
an empirical basis the exact role of countries of origin in immigrants’ integration 
and vice versa. What does clearly emerge is the relevance of integration for develop-
ment in the countries of origin. Furthermore, transnational studies point to the need 
to look simultaneously at immigrants’ integration (or lack thereof) in the place of 
origin, place of destination, and possibly also within a socially-relevant transna-
tional migrant community. From this perspective more research is needed to assess 
whether and how these processes of integration relate to each other.
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